In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Plato's Doctrine of the Psyche as a Self-Moving Motion RAPHAEL DEMOS I WILLXSXTHEREADERto ignore for the time being what he has gleaned about the soul from the reading of the Phaedo and the Republic. In these dialogues Plato speaks of the soul sometimes as wholly rational, as having three parts, and so forth. But in these dialogues he is t~lklng of the human soul, which is a special (...) case, whereas in this essay I am de~Hng with the wider role and the concept of the soul as the efficient cause of motion, change, and all becoming everywhere in the cosmos. My cardinal texts in this exposition are the Sophist (246a-249d), the Phaedrus (245c, d), and a considerable portion of Laws, X. Consider the Phaedo, a dialogue with at least four motifs: it is a dramatic evocation of the last day in the life of Socrates, it is an argument for the immortality of the soul and for the reality of the world of ideas, it is a myth of the nether world, and finally, it is a theory of the cosmos as ruled by purpose--all in all, one of the great pieces of literature of the Western world. For the reader, it is an evocation of an attitude to life, based on Plato's conception of the soul--an attitude expressed in the famous phrase that the wise man spends his life meditating on death. As contrasted with what may be called his existential concern with the soul, in the other dialogues on which I will comment, Plato approaches the topic of the soul as part of his explanation of the cosmos. In these his attitude is objective and quasi-scientific. It is to this side of Plato's thought that I wish to call attention in this essay, where the establishment of the immortality of the soul is incidental to the more basic doctrine that the soul is an arche, a primary factor and an ontological principle. In the,Sophist, we find Plato playing the music of his philosophy in a new key. He refers to the "friends of the forms" as though he, himself, were an outsider looking in; then, too, he asserts that motion is really real in contrast to his derogatory references to motion in the Cratylus, the Phaedo, and the Republic.I In these (and other) dialogues, Plato contrasts change and changing things with the timeless forms in respect of reality: the former are said, at best, to be semi-real; only the latter are really real. But in the Sophist he changes his tune, arguing that total reality (~o ~v, to' ~a~rE~ By) includes both motion and rest (248e 8; 249d 3-4). What does he mean by these two words? That by 'rest' he means the realm of ideas is indicated (if not proved) by his references to the forms in the same context (247b 1But in the Theaeteius,he classifiesmotions in a semi-scientific fashion, leaving the impression on the reader that he regards motion as a reality. [133] 134 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 1-2; 249b, 10, c 1).2 As for motion, Plato makes it clear that the term covers not only (a) physical motion but also (b) life, (c) psyche, and (d) phronesis or naus (249b 5). All these are said to be forms of kinesis; how this is so--how life, soul, mason may be described as motions or changes--is a matter for later comment. What is more to the point is Plato's insistence that motion and what is moved are onta (beings, 249b 2, d 3). Plato uses change (metabol$) interchangeably with kinesis; anticipating the Phaedrus, I will include activity under change. And anticipating the Laws, I will characterize some of this activity as mental; indeed the Sophist, includes within change nous, phronesis, and episteme; that is to say, understanding (in the sense of an activity, 249a, b, c).s Plato offers various reasons in support of his contention that change is real. He may also be offering a special demonstration as follows. The philosopher who denies that change is real is engaged in a mental activity, in short... (shrink)

Jung has long been a doctor for mental illness; at Zurich and elsewhere the list of his patients---many of them American--is very large. But he has never been merely a practising physician of mental ills; he has all along been a student of the human psyche, both abnormal and normal. The forces impelling him to his investigations are surely complex. Jung, no doubt, is concerned with therapy--a therapy of the ills not only of particular individuals, but of societies too. Indeed, (...) he is deeply worried over the direction in which our Western culture is proceeding, and, like a prophet, he speaks out with vigor against present trends. But his interest in psychological phenomena goes far beyond the bounds prescribed by the pursuit of practical results. He is also an independent inquirer who seeks understanding for its own sake, and is concerned with extending the boundaries of our theoretical knowledge in psychology. He is a student not only of the individual mind but of culture as well--or, as he would prefer to put it, of the collective mind. Indeed, one of the points we must consider is whether, as has been alleged by some of his critics, Jung sinks the individual into the collective pool of the psyche, there to drown him. The question, in other words, is whether Jung believes that there is a group mind as an entity existing over and above individual minds. (shrink)

1. Concerning the meaning of reality, Mr. Demos asserts that, according to me, "what we call real is wholly relative to our purposes" and then points out that this is not what "real" means when we ask about a story whether what it relates really happened.

In the midst of his account of the events, Thucydides says that it was difficult to switch Athens from democracy to the oligarchic rule of the Four Hundred (8.68.4). Most modem scholars have agreed, viewing the rise of the Four Hundred primarily as a coup effected by violence, terror and deceit. This interpretation does not conform to Thucydides' narrative (8.47-70), however, which shows that it was not very hard to end the Athenian democracy. Although terror, violence and propaganda have their (...) place in Thucydides' account, modem treatments overemphasize them and so ignore or gloss over Thucydides' charge that the Athenian people did not resist oligarchy very strenuously and so bear a large share of responsibility for it. In Thucydides' narrative Peisander et al. are open about plans for oligarchy (if not for the extremely limited oligarchy that they eventually put in place at Kolonos) both on Samos and in Athens, and meet little resistance from democratic supporters. In addition, Thucydides' rhetoric repeatedly mutes what resistance there is, as if to underscore its weakness. Thucydides' Athenians for the most part quickly and easily abandon their democracy. There was a 'terror' campaign, but its scope, effect and need has been exaggerated. In particular, there is no reason to think that the location of the Kolonos meeting - where the Athenians voted the limited oligarchy of the Four Hundred into power-terrified them into doing so. Thucydides' comment on the difficulty of the task of the Four Hundred is ironic. There is a jarring contrast between Thucydides' judgement and his narrative which, when recognized, compels readers to re-examine their own assumptions and expectations. The attention modem commentators have given to Thucydides' words about intimidation and propaganda have left them deaf to the other interesting story Thucydides has to tell about the role the Athenian demos played in the move to oligarchy. (shrink)

Three famous sophists are referred to together in the Apology of Sokrates as still practising their enviably lucrative itinerant profession in 399 b.c. : Gorgias of Leontinoi, Prodikos of Keos and Hippias of Elis. The last of these was the least well known to the Athenian demos, having practised mainly in I Dorian cities. There is no extant reference to him in Old Comedy, but we can assume that he was sufficiently famous – especially for his fees – to (...) justify his inclusion as the third of this ‘triad’; cf. the triad Protagoras – Hippias – Prodikos in the Protagoras, considered further below. Gorgias was by now a grand old man of about ninety , the last survivor of the first generation of fee-taking educators, associated first and foremost in the popular mind with the suspect arts of political and forensic persuasion. Prodikos and Hippias were probably in their sixties. (shrink)

In this essay, I consider three different conceptions of ‘the people’ and what it means to ‘respect’ their collective will and wisdom: (a) the democratic conception of the people as a sprawling demos, (b) the populist conception of the people as an authentic folk (c) and, finally, the vanguardist conception of the people as the semi-mute masses who stand in need of revolutionary transformation. Although my ultimate aim is to defend the democratic conception of the people over both the (...) populist conception and the vanguardist conception, much of this essay is taken up simply spelling out each of these conceptions of the people and outlining their consequences for the conduct of politics. I begin by contrasting the democratic conception with the populist conception. I then turn briefly to the vanguardist conception. I close with a brief, and admittedly incomplete defence of a particular form of democracy – what I call transformative or ameliorative democracy – which conceives of the people as a self-transformative totality. (shrink)

John Dewey expresses repeatedly that the significance of democracy is more than political discourse. He invites us to realize that democracy is primarily moral idea that animates a process of living and should be actualized continuously. He underlines that the idea of liberty, equality and fraternity, which is the democratic trinity, is ethical ideal of humanity in which personality is at the centre of reflection. Every human individual is free to actualize its self-realization. His liberty is based on the belief (...) that every human individual has a right to equal opportunity with every other person to develop whatever endowment he has. Then, democracy indicates fraternity as an ethical value, which every human individual is able to actualize his capacities only in actively cooperative relationship with other. Political and social democracy presenting in a real association of life will be effectively sustained if its values of ideal hu-manity becomes an animating force of life. In other words, he envisions that democracy becomes a personal way of life. Keywords: values of democracy, social responsibility, culture of democracy, transformation of life, peaceful life. Absrak: John Dewey menyatakan berulangkali bahwa demokrasi lebih dari sekedar persoalan politik. Ia menunjukkan bahwa demokrasi pertama-tama merupakan sebuah gagasan etis yang menjiwai proses hidup secara terus-menerus. Kebebasan, kesederajatan, dan persaudaraan yang menjadi inti demokrasi merupakan nilai-nilai etis kemanusiaan yang menjadi arah hidup manusia di dalam kehidupan bersama di tengah masyarakat. Setiap individu adalah bebas untuk mewujudkan dirinya. Kebebasannya didasarkan pada keyakinan bahwa setiap individu mempunyai hak dan kesempatan yang sama untuk mengembangkan diri sesuai dengan potensi yang dianugerahkan kepadanya. Persaudaraan merupakan nilai etis yang menegaskan bahwa setiap individu hanya mampu mewujudkan diri di dalam relasi dan kerjasama dengan sesamanya. Ketiga nilai etis tersebut seharusnya menjiwai tata hidup bersama. Dengan kata lain, demokrasi seharusnya menjadi pola hidup setiap pribadi sebagai anggota masyarakat. Kata-kata Kunci: nilai-nilai demokrasi, tanggung jawab sosial, budaya demo-krasi, transformasi hidup, hidup damai. (shrink)

Proceedings of the papers presented at the Symposium on "Revisiting Turing and his Test: Comprehensiveness, Qualia, and the Real World" at the 2012 AISB and IACAP Symposium that was held in the Turing year 2012, 2–6 July at the University of Birmingham, UK. Ten papers. - http://www.pt-ai.org/turing-test --- Daniel Devatman Hromada: From Taxonomy of Turing Test-Consistent Scenarios Towards Attribution of Legal Status to Meta-modular Artificial Autonomous Agents - Michael Zillich: My Robot is Smarter than Your Robot: On the Need for (...) a Total Turing Test for Robots - Adam Linson, Chris Dobbyn and Robin Laney: Interactive Intelligence: Behaviour-based AI, Musical HCI and the Turing Test - Javier Insa, Jose Hernandez-Orallo, Sergio España - David Dowe and M.Victoria Hernandez-Lloreda: The anYnt Project Intelligence Test (Demo) - Jose Hernandez-Orallo, Javier Insa, David Dowe and Bill Hibbard: Turing Machines and Recursive Turing Tests — Francesco Bianchini and Domenica Bruni: What Language for Turing Test in the Age of Qualia? - Paul Schweizer: Could there be a Turing Test for Qualia? - Antonio Chella and Riccardo Manzotti: Jazz and Machine Consciousness: Towards a New Turing Test - William York and Jerry Swan: Taking Turing Seriously (But Not Literally) - Hajo Greif: Laws of Form and the Force of Function: Variations on the Turing Test. (shrink)

Theorists, historians, and artists address the precarious futurity of the notion of the future. Not long ago, a melancholic left and a manic neoliberalism seemed to arrive at an awkward consensus: the foreclosure of futurity. Whereas the former mourned the failure of its utopian project, the latter celebrated the triumph of a global marketplace. The radical hope of realizing a singularly different, more equitable future displaced by a belief that the future had already come to pass, limiting post-historical society to (...) an uneventful life of endless accumulation. Today, amidst an abundance of neofuturisms, posthumanisms, futurologies, speculative philosophies and accelerationist scenarios, there is as well an expanding awareness of a looming planetary catastrophe driven by the extractionist logic of capitalism. Despite this return to the future, the temporal horizon of our present moment is perhaps more aptly characterized by the “shrinking future” of just-in-time production, risk management, high-frequency trading, and the futures market. In Futurity Report, theorists, historians, and artists address the precarious futurity of the notion of the future itself. Contributors McKenzie Wark, China Miéville, Kerstin Stakemeier, Diedrich Diederichsen, Natascha Sadr Haghighian, Marina Vishmidt, Johannes Paul Raether, Felicity D. Scott, Silvia Maglioni, Graeme Thomson, Doreen Mende, Pedro Neves Marques, Achille Mbembe, Kodwo Eshun, Haytham El-Wardany, T. J. Demos, Ana Teixeira Pinto. (shrink)

Examines the role played by the Aristotelian logic in Neoplatonic philosophers. To start with, it is remarked that Aristotelian Organon was regarded not only as a corpus of logical texts but also as an introduction to philosophy. Focuses on several Neoplatonic Aristotelian commentators, from Alexander of Aphrodisias to Byzantine thinkers, presenting both the characteristics of their works and their lack of interest in discussing their own philosophical view. Finally, it is observed that, although not original, these commentaries provide a rather (...) reliable and correct investigation of Aristotle. (shrink)

In contrast with the different views of some recent scholars, Ch. 7 constitutes an important attempt to point out the importance played by non‐discursive thought in Plotinus and Proclus in several ways. Firstly, the differences between the doctrines of Plotinus and Proclus are investigated. Secondly, it is considered the role of the ‘Loving Intellect’ in both Plotinus’ and Proclus’ philosophy. Thirdly, it is indicated how the One plays a crucial role in the mystical experience and how this kind of experience (...) may be an evidence of the activity of the One. Finally, it is shown how some problems and difficulties of Plotinus’ philosophy may be explained through reference to the mystical experience. (shrink)

Devoted to the key Neoplatonic concepts of procession and emanation. The two terms are taken to express the same idea, although procession is preferred as more neutral. Points out how procession can be explained in Aristotelian terms. More specifically, it is demonstrated how Plotinus’ notion of procession uses the Aristotelian theory of the actualization of an activity by a potency in order to explain how a higher activity can actualize a lower one. Finally, considers the doctrine of Proclus who expresses (...) the procession, involving the theory of causal relation, in a way opposite to Plotinus. (shrink)

Focuses on Porphyry's semantic and more specifically on his theory of ‘imposition of names’, i.e. how names are related to things. Examines Porphyry's treatment of genus and species and also of individual, singular, and general terms to emphasize his peculiarity in Neoplatonic philosophy. Infers that Porphyry's attitude is not to develop a metaphysical and a logical semantics, but only a metaphysical one. Finally, considers how Porphyry's metaphysical approach towards semantics was maintained by eleventh and twelfth century Byzantine Neoplatonists.

The core of the third chapter is the study of the P‐series. This theory is presented after a detailed discussion of the relationship of individuals to species and genus. A P‐series is a sequence of terms classified according to priority and posteriority starting from the most universal one. This theory is the result of the evolution of the Aristotelian doctrine of pros en done in order to fit with the not strictly Aristotelian notion of ‘genus’ of some Neoplatonic philosophers.

The purpose of Ch. 6 is to outline the role played by the P‐series theory in Neoplatonic epistemology. To start with, it is explained that knowledge of a P‐series consists in an order of priority and posteriority of the terms: intellect, scientific knowledge, belief, presentation, and perception. In second place, some peculiar Neoplatonic epistemological issues, e.g. how can the divine possibly know temporal truths, are carefully examined. To conclude, some particular Neoplatonic rules, which allow higher entities to have knowledge of (...) lower ones, are investigated. (shrink)

Investigates how, given their ontological status between the One and animals, men can either ascend to the intellectual life or fall into the inferior kinds of life. Different issues involved in the doctrine of the rise to the intellectual life are considered. Firstly, the restriction to men of the possibility of an intellectual life is explained through the reference to Neoplatonists’ own personal experiences. Secondly, the experience of the ascent is defined by the term ‘inclination’ rather than the too broad (...) ‘reversion’ used by most of the scholars. The former term, indeed, seems to fit better in the case of men. Finally, the experience of inclination is explained in terms of logical necessity. (shrink)

The Euclidean Programme embodies a traditional sort of epistemological foundationalism, according to which knowledge – especially mathematical knowledge – is obtained by deduction from self-evident axioms or first principles. Epistemologists have examined foundationalism extensively, but neglected its historically dominant Euclidean form. By contrast, this book offers a detailed examination of Euclidean foundationalism, which, following Lakatos, the authors call the Euclidean Programme. The book rationally reconstructs the programme's key principles, showing it to be an epistemological interpretation of the axiomatic method. It (...) then compares the reconstructed programme with select historical sources: Euclid's Elements, Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, Descartes's Discourse on Method, Pascal's On the Geometric Mind and a twentieth-century account of axiomatisation. The second half of the book philosophically assesses the programme, exploring whether various areas of contemporary mathematics conform to it. The book concludes by outlining a replacement for the Euclidean Programme. (shrink)

In mathematics, the deductive method reigns. Without proof, a claim remains unsolved, a mere conjecture, not something that can be simply assumed; when a proof is found, the problem is solved, it turns into a “result,” something that can be relied on. So mathematicians think. But is there more to mathematical justification than proof?The answer is an emphatic yes, as I explain in this chapter. I argue that non-deductive justification is in fact pervasive in mathematics, and that it is in (...) good epistemic standing. (shrink)

The meaning ofdēmokratiais widely agreed: ‘rule by the people’ (less often ‘people-power’), wheredēmos, ‘people’, implies ‘entire citizen body’, synonymous withpolis, ‘city-state’, or πάντες πολίται, ‘all citizens’.Dēmos, on this understanding, comprised rich and poor, leaders and followers, mass and elite alike. As such,dēmokratiais interpreted as constituting a sharp rupture from previous political regimes. Rule by one man or by a few had meant the domination of one part of the community over the rest, butdēmokratia, it is said, implied self-rule, and with (...) it the dissolution of the very distinction between ruler and ruled. Its governing principle was the formal political equality of all citizens. In the words of W.G. Forrest, between 750 and 450b.c.there had developed ‘the idea of individual human autonomy … the idea that all members of a political society are free and equal, that everyone had the right to an equal say in determining the structure and the activities of his society’. (shrink)